Vulnerability analysis of hydrological infrastructure to flooding in coastal cities - a graph theory approach by Ogie, Robert Ighodaro et al.
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences -
Papers: Part A Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences
2016
Vulnerability analysis of hydrological infrastructure
to flooding in coastal cities - a graph theory
approach
Robert Ighodaro Ogie
University of Wollongong, rogie@uow.edu.au
Tomas Holderness
University of Wollongong, tomas@uow.edu.au
Sarah Dunn
Newcastle University
Etienne Turpin
University of Wollongong, eturpin@uow.edu.au
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Publication Details
Ogie, R. I., Holderness, T., Dunn, S. & Turpin, E. (2016). Vulnerability analysis of hydrological infrastructure to flooding in coastal
cities - a graph theory approach. In R. J. Mair, K. Soga, Y. Jin, A. K. Parlikad & J. M. Schooling (Eds.), Transforming the Future of
Infrastructure Through Smarter Information: Proceedings of the International Conference on Smart Infrastructure and Construction
(pp. 633-644). London, United Kingdom: ICE Publishing.
Vulnerability analysis of hydrological infrastructure to flooding in coastal
cities - a graph theory approach
Abstract
Hydrological infrastructure such as pumps and floodgates are invaluable assets for mitigating flooding in
coastal cities. These infrastructure components are often vulnerable to damage or failure due to the impact of
flood waters, thus exacerbating the flood hazards and causing significant loss of life and destruction to
property worth billions of dollars. Hence, there is a growing need worldwide to enhance the understanding of
flood vulnerability and to develop key metrics for assessing it. This study proposes an approach for measuring
the vulnerability of hydrological infrastructure to flood damage in coastal cities. In this approach, a
hydrological infrastructure flood vulnerability index (HIFVI) is developed based on exposure, sensitivity and
resilience of infrastructure assets to flooding. A graph-theoretic algorithm for implementing the proposed
HIFVI is presented and applied to assess the flood vulnerability of floodgates in one of the most
representative coastal cities - Jakarta, Indonesia. The application involves the construction of a graph-based
spatio-topological network model of Jakarta's hydrological system, with floodgates represented as network
nodes and waterways as edges. An analysis of the constructed network is carried out based on the underlying
graph-theoretic algorithm to compute HIFVI for all nodes that represent floodgates. The results show that
HIFVI can point to the most vulnerable hydrological infrastructure components and also highlight locations
within coastal cities where additional infrastructure are required to improve resilience to flooding. These
information are vital to decision makers when planning and prioritising infrastructure maintenance and
resource allocation for flood preparedness in coastal cities.
Keywords
theory, graph, cities, coastal, flooding, infrastructure, approach, hydrological, vulnerability, analysis
Disciplines
Engineering | Science and Technology Studies
Publication Details
Ogie, R. I., Holderness, T., Dunn, S. & Turpin, E. (2016). Vulnerability analysis of hydrological infrastructure
to flooding in coastal cities - a graph theory approach. In R. J. Mair, K. Soga, Y. Jin, A. K. Parlikad & J. M.
Schooling (Eds.), Transforming the Future of Infrastructure Through Smarter Information: Proceedings of
the International Conference on Smart Infrastructure and Construction (pp. 633-644). London, United
Kingdom: ICE Publishing.
This conference paper is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/6441
Vulnerability analysis of hydrological infrastructure to 
flooding in coastal cities - A graph theory approach 
 
R.I. Ogie*1, T. Holderness1, S. Dunn2 and E. Turpin1 
1
 Smart Infrastructure Facility, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia 
2
 School of Civil Engineering & Geosciences, Newcastle University, Newcastle, UK 
*
 Corresponding Author 
ABSTRACT  Hydrological infrastructure such as pumps and floodgates are invaluable assets for mitigating flooding in coastal cities. These 
infrastructure components are often vulnerable to damage or failure due to the impact of flood waters, thus exacerbating the flood hazards 
and causing significant loss of life and destruction to property worth billions of dollars. Hence, there is a growing need worldwide to en-
hance the understanding of flood vulnerability and to develop key metrics for assessing it. This study proposes an approach for measuring 
the vulnerability of hydrological infrastructure to flood damage in coastal cities. In this approach, a hydrological infrastructure flood vul-
nerability index (HIFVI) is developed based on exposure, sensitivity and resilience of infrastructure assets to flooding. A graph-theoretic 
algorithm for implementing the proposed HIFVI is presented and applied to assess the flood vulnerability of floodgates in one of the most 
representative coastal cities - Jakarta, Indonesia. The application involves the construction of a graph-based spatio-topological network 
model of Jakarta’s hydrological system, with floodgates represented as network nodes and waterways as edges. An analysis of the con-
structed network is carried out based on the underlying graph-theoretic algorithm to compute HIFVI for all nodes that represent floodgates. 
The results show that HIFVI can point to the most vulnerable hydrological infrastructure components and also highlight locations within 
coastal cities where additional infrastructure are required to improve resilience to flooding. These information are vital to decision makers 
when planning and prioritising infrastructure maintenance and resource allocation for flood preparedness in coastal cities. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
With the increasing frequency and intensity of rain-
fall and associated floods in coastal cities, there is a 
need to judiciously allocate limited resources for rou-
tine maintenance and upgrade of existing hydrologi-
cal infrastructure (e.g. pumping stations, floodgates), 
in a manner that improves their resilience and mini-
mises their failure during extreme flooding events 
(Sadoff et al. 2013). Ideally, such resource alloca-
tions and investment decisions should be effectively 
targeted at the most vulnerable components in the 
hydrological infrastructure system. By so doing, the 
failure of the hydrological infrastructure system and 
the resulting loss of life and property damage associ-
ated with flood inundation can be minimised (Hall et 
al. 2003). Though a quantitative assessment of vul-
nerability can point decision makers to the most vul-
nerable components in the hydrological infrastructure 
network, this is not a straightforward task that lends 
itself to a standardised process of finding suitable 
metrics (Balica et al. 2012). In the context of coastal 
cities situated in developing nations, this task is fur-
ther complicated by the lack of sufficient data, poten-
tially limiting the range of possible solutions (Brecht 
et al. 2012). 
To address this issue, this study proposes a graph-
based network approach for measuring hydrological 
infrastructure flood vulnerability index (HIFVI), us-
ing the concepts of exposure, sensitivity and resili-
ence. The graph theory approach provides a rigorous 
mathematical basis for computationally reducing 
vulnerability to a single metric, using very little 
available data within the data-starved environment 
and allowing for further improvement from the initial 
results as additional data becomes available in the fu-
ture (Bunn et al. 2000). In this approach, a graph-
theoretic algorithm for implementing the proposed 
HIFVI will be developed and applied to assess and 
rank the flood vulnerability of Jakarta’s floodgates, 
using the constructed spatio-topological network 
model of the city’s hydrological system. The follow-
ing section establishes the general equation for com-
puting the flood vulnerability index of hydrological 
infrastructure components.  
2 DERIVATION OF FLOOD VULNERABILITY 
INDEX FOR HYDROLOGICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE COMPONENTS 
Generally, vulnerability is determined based on three 
main factors: exposure, sensitivity (or susceptibility), 
and resilience (Balica et al. 2012). This can be repre-
sented mathematically using the general flood vul-
nerability index (FVI) formula (Eq. 1) (Balica et al. 
2012). 
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The exposure of any given floodgate is determined 
by the length of all waterways that flow from up-
stream towards it (Balica et al. 2012). Given that the 
number of waterways that flow from upstream to-
wards a given floodgate can range from 1 to n, the 
length, l, for each of these waterways can be summed 
to determine the exposure, E, of the floodgate. Math-
ematically, this can be represented as shown in Eq. 2. 
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Susceptibility is a system characteristic, which de-
termines the degree to which the system is affected 
by the impact of flood waters (Balica et al. 2012). In 
this study the capacity of the floodgate is used as a 
measure of susceptibility to flood damage. During in-
tense flood events, a floodgate with lower capacity is 
considered more susceptible to failure or breakdown 
as compared to one with a greater capacity.  Hence, 
given that Cg is the capacity of a given floodgate, 
susceptibility, S would decrease as Cg increases. This 
relationship can be represented mathematically as 
shown in Eq. 3.  
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Resilience can be derived as a function of redun-
dancy (Chang & Shinozuka 2004). In this study, the 
resilience of a given floodgate, FG, in the hydrologi-
cal infrastructure network is determined based on re-
dundancy provided by connected upstream flood-
gates (Chang & Shinozuka 2004). Factors considered 
in measuring the redundancy provided by each con-
nected upstream floodgate include capacity, c, geo-
metric length, l (i.e. distance along flow path(s) to 
FG), and the upstream network configuration.  The 
connected upstream floodgates with higher value of c 
and lower value of l contribute more to the resilience 
of FG. In terms of upstream network configuration, a 
connected upstream floodgate would contribute max-
imally to the resilience of FG if its location in the 
network allows it to divert floodwater from all the 
different channels flowing to FG. However, with ad-
ditional number of channels, w, connecting the link 
between the two floodgates, the contribution of the 
upstream floodgate to the resilience of FG reduces 
accordingly. Hence, given that FG has m number of 
connected upstream floodgates, its total resilience, R 
can be estimated using Eq. 4.   
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 is the structural resilience of the referent flood-
gate based on the physical property of its material, 
∑

∗

  is the total resilience contributed by the 
connected upstream floodgates, where i is an element 
in the set of connected upstream floodgates, which 
may be made up of 0 to m members. 0 member 
means that there are no connected upstream flood-
gates, in which case ∑

∗

 = 0 and  = .   
 
By substituting Eq. 2, 3, and 4 into Eq. 1, a gen-
eral equation (Eq. 5) is obtained for estimating FVI 
(i.e. HIFVI) in the context of hydrological infrastruc-
ture (specifically floodgate) for flood mitigation.  
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A graph-theoretic algorithm for applying Eq.5 to 
compute the HIFVI for the floodgates in a hydrologi-
cal infrastructure network is shown below.  
 
Begin  
V = set of all nodes in the network, G. 
       A node, v represents either a junction or floodgate. 
E = set of all edges in the network, G. 
      An edge, e is represented as (* *+), where * 	= start node  
      and *+	= finish node. 
-= set of all floodgates in the network, such that - ∈  
For g such that g ∈ -: 
Do  
    1. Obtain the capacity, /0 of g  
       (Note: /0	is encoded as an attribute in network nodes). 
    2. Compute total length of waterways, 10 connected to g. 
             --2- = 0   (Initialisation)  
             --Find -, set of all upstream nodes connected to g  
             -- For e such that e ∈ E: 
                       if (*  ∈ -) and (*+  ∈ -) 
                             2-= 2-+ (geometric length, l of e)  
             --Return the value of 2-  
    3. Compute 34, the set of floodgates linked to g upstream.            
    4. Compute the total resilience, 564 contributed by the 
        upstream floodgates connected to g in four steps: 
             + = 0   (Initialisation)  
             -- For f such that f ∈ Fc: 
         (i). Compute c, being the capacity of f.   
         (ii). Compute the total number of additional waterways, 
                 W joining the link between each connected upstream 
                 floodgate and g (i.e. a measure of branchness factor). 
 W = 1   (Initialisation)  
                       += set of all nodes in the shortest path between f    
                       and g.                                .  
                       For p such that p ∈ +: 
                             78= the number of inward edges to p  
                             if 78 > 1 (an indication of branchness) 
                                     W = W + 78 
     Return the value of W 
         (iii). Compute the total length of waterways, L between f 
                   and g. 
   L = 0   (Initialisation)  
                      			+= set of all nodes in the shortest path between f  
                         and g.                
                         For e such that e ∈ E: 
                              if (*  ∈ +) and (*+  ∈ +) 
                                    L = L + (geometric length, l of e) 
                         Return the value of L  
         (iv). Compute sum of the resilience contributed by all  
                   upstream floodgates connected to g. 
 			+ = + +

9∗:
                           
    5. Compute the total resilience, R of g. 
            --  = 1 (structural resilience,  is assigned a constant 
                           value of 1 for all floodgates in the network.) 
            --  =  + +  
    6. Compute the flood vulnerability index, HIFVI of g. 
            --  =
9
∗
  
End  
3 A CASE STUDY APPLICATION: 
JAKARTA’S HYDROLOGICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORK 
Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia was selected for this 
study because it is one of the most exemplary coastal 
cities of developing nations that depend heavily on 
structural measures or hydrological infrastructure 
(e.g. floodgates, pumps, etc.) to mitigate the devastat-
ing impact of flooding on the people, property, econ-
omy, and environment (Li 2003). As a low-lying del-
ta city served by thirteen rivers, Jakarta relies on a 
network of pumping stations and floodgates to con-
trol water flowing from surrounding hills and moun-
tains, through the city to the Java Sea (Hartono et al. 
2010). The frequent use of these ageing and poorly 
maintained hydrological infrastructure components 
during the annual monsoonal flooding (between No-
vember and March) exposes them to the damaging 
impacts of floodwaters, with possibility of break-
down or failure as a consequence (Turpin et al. 
2013). Generally, the pumping stations are used to 
move out accumulating floodwater, particularly in 
low lying areas where drainage is difficult without 
pumping (Tingsanchali 2012). On the other hand, the 
action of closing a floodgate allows it to be used for 
diverting floodwater away from flooded areas located 
downstream of the floodgate. Because the acquired 
dataset for the pumping stations was incomplete at 
the time of this study, this application focuses on just 
the floodgates infrastructure in Jakarta. 
The floodgate dataset, in addition to Jakarta’s wa-
terways (i.e. rivers, canals, and streams) were ac-
quired and processed in readiness for network con-
struction and subsequent vulnerability analysis. The 
data acquisition involved the use of ground survey, 
GPS locations and aerial imagery analysis to capture 
and record the names and locations of the different 
floodgates and waterways in Jakarta. The resulting 
waterways vector data is of line geometry type while 
the floodgates vector data made up of 30 records is of 
point geometry type. Using the topology toolset and 
GRASS plugin within the QGIS software, these da-
tasets were processed to remove topological and lo-
cational errors introduced during survey and digitisa-
tion of mapped data. Furthermore, edges in the 
waterways dataset were programmatically split into 
separate line features where they self-intersected or 
intersected with floodgate infrastructure. This is to 
ensure that at the construction of the hydrological in-
frastructure network, junctions are created were they 
actually exist. 
The graph-based spatio-topological network mod-
el of Jakarta’s hydrological infrastructure was con-
structed using the PostGIS spatial database schema 
and coupled Python interface to the NetworkX graph 
analysis package developed by Newcastle University 
(Barr et al. 2012). This software was first extended to 
support the proposed graph type (i.e. multidigraph), 
which permits multiple edges between the same 
source and target nodes.  Topology was encoded 
within the data using a system of unique node and 
edge primary keys. In the absence of high resolution 
and accurate elevation data to model flow direction 
of Jakarta’s waterways, directionality was inferred by 
edge orientation assuming the general condition of 
water flowing from the mountains of Bogor to the 
south of Jakarta, and through the city to the Java Sea 
in the north. Where exceptions to this assumption ex-
isted based on actual field observations of water flow 
in the city of Jakarta, corrective adjustments of edge 
orientation were made by re-ordering (i.e. reversing) 
the geometric points in the linestrings.  
The completed network comprised of 628 edges 
representing Jakarta’s waterways, with a total geo-
metric length of 1092 km. There were 560 nodes in 
the network, 30 of which represent floodgate infra-
structure, and the remaining 464 representing net-
work junctions (e.g. river confluences). Figure 1 
highlights the locations of the floodgate infrastruc-
ture in the network. 
Following the successful construction of the net-
work model, the NetworkX and the Pandas Python 
libraries were used in implementing the underlying 
graph-theoretic algorithm, resulting in the computa-
tion of HIFVI for all 30 floodgate infrastructure in 
Jakarta. In this implementation, certain assumptions 
were made. For instance, in the absence of relevant 
data to determine structural resilience,  this param-
eter was assumed to be a constant value of 1 for each 
floodgate in the network. Similarly, in the absence of 
data for floodgate capacity, the number of gates in 
each floodgate was used as a proxy for capacity. The 
computed HIFVI values were stored in a PostGIS da-
tabase table and accessible for visualisation using ge-
ographical information system software (e.g. QGIS). 
 
 
Figure 1. Jakarta’s floodgate infrastructure network 
 
4 RESULTS 
The results of an application of the graph-theoretic 
algorithm to Jakarta’s hydrological infrastructure are 
index values representing the degree to which each 
floodgate in the city is vulnerable to failure or dam-
age due to the impact of flood waters. The index val-
ues (i.e. HIFVI) were normalised to give a number 
from 0 to 1, where 0 does not mean absence of vul-
nerability, but rather a representation of the lowest 
vulnerability and 1 indicates the highest in this da-
taset. This approach allows for a comparative as-
sessment of infrastructure vulnerability to flood haz-
ards (Balica et al. 2012).  
To further characterise hydrological infrastructure 
based on computed HIFVI, index values were classi-
fied into 5 different levels of vulnerability as follows: 
0-0.2 = very low vulnerability, 0.2-0.4 = low vulner-
ability, 04-0.6 = moderate vulnerability, 0.6-0.8 = 
high vulnerability, and 0.8-1 = very high vulnerabil-
ity (see Table 1).  
The results show that “Sunter C” topped the cate-
gory of very high vulnerability floodgates, thereby 
ranking as the most vulnerable floodgate with com-
puted HIFVI value of 1. On the other hand, “Sunter 
Utara” had the lowest computed HIFVI value of 0, 
making it the least vulnerable to failure or damage 
arising from the impact of flood waters. Overall, Ta-
ble 1 shows that 10% (i.e. three) of Jakarta’s flood-
gates were classified as having very high vulnerabil-
ity to failure or damage due to the impact of flood 
waters. Another 3.33% (i.e. one) of the floodgates 
was moderately vulnerable, but 0% (i.e. none) was 
classified as highly vulnerable based on computed 
HIFVI. Most floodgates (i.e. 17) came under the cat-
egory of very low vulnerability, representing 56.67% 
of the entire sampled infrastructure. This is closely 
followed by another 30% (i.e. 9) classified as having 
low vulnerability to failure or damage due to the im-
pact of flood waters. These results and their implica-
tions are discussed further in the subsequent section. 
 
Table 1: Vulnerability ranking of Jakarta’s floodgate 
infrastructure based on computed HIFVI 
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Sunter C 1.00 1.45 199.89 1.000 VH 
Ciliwung Lama 1.00 1.05 133.65 0.921 VH  
Kebon Baru 1.00 1.00 122.59 0.890 VH 
Muara Angke 0.50 1.43 203.95 0.518 M 
Cakung Drainase 0.33 1.00 164.23 0.397 L 
Karet 2 0.50 1.39 150.31 0.391 L  
Pasar Ikan 0.25 1.51 307.40 0.370 L  
Hailai 0.50 1.78 169.77 0.346 L  
Istiqlal 0.33 1.13 160.47 0.343 L  
Tangki 0.50 1.94 164.02 0.306 L  
Jembatan Merah 0.25 1.10 163.09 0.268 L  
Kali Cideng 0.33 1.50 157.59 0.253 L 
Citra Land 0.33 1.75 153.79 0.212 L  
Cengkareng Drain 0.25 1.00 101.23 0.182 VL 
Pulogadung 0.17 1.00 143.50 0.172 VL 
Ancol 0.20 1.52 176.82 0.168 VL 
Pekapuran 0.20 1.64 170.12 0.149 VL 
8 0.13 1.26 151.23 0.108 VL 
Sogo 0.50 1.53 36.24 0.084 VL 
Poglar 0.33 1.00 33.81 0.080 VL 
Warung Pedok 0.50 1.00 12.81 0.045 VL 
Manggarai 0.33 1.19 21.79 0.043 VL 
Setia Budi 0.33 1.15 19.70 0.040 VL 
Minangkabau 0.50 1.64 15.94 0.034 VL 
Kampung Gusti 0.50 7.25 34.29 0.016 VL 
Kalimati 0.50 1.00 3.04 0.009 VL 
Honda 0.17 1.00 6.84 0.007 VL 
Duri 0.33 1.00 3.09 0.006 VL 
Karet 0.25 63.26 150.34 0.003 VL 
Sunter Utara 0.25 1.00 0.92 0.000 VL 
VH= Very High, M = Medium, L = Low, and VL = 
Very Low. 
5 DISCUSSIONS 
This study has proposed a new flood vulnerability 
index and an underlying graph-theoretic algorithm to 
comparatively assess and rank floodgates in coastal 
cities based on their exposure, susceptibility, and re-
silience to flooding. An application of the graph-
theoretic algorithm to Jakarta’s hydrological infra-
structure produced index values that point to the most 
vulnerable floodgates in the network (see Table 1). 
“Sunter C” ranked as the most vulnerable floodgate 
in Jakarta, followed by “Ciliwung Lama”, and “Ke-
bon Baru” in that order. These three floodgates are 
characterised as having very high vulnerability and 
they represent the top 10% of Jakarta’s floodgate in-
frastructure that are most likely to fail during a flood 
event. Hence, they should be prioritised during infra-
structure maintenance and resource allocation for 
flood preparedness. To minimise their vulnerability 
to flood damage, limited resources can be judiciously 
spent on increasing their capacities by adding extra 
gate units where possible. No doubt, this outcome 
will be useful to coastal communities and external 
funding bodies who often require structured vulnera-
bility assessment techniques that facilitate transparent 
and efficient decisions on where the limited resources 
allocated for flood mitigation should be invested. 
Furthermore, because “Kebon Baru” does not cur-
rently have any upstream floodgate connected to it, 
its vulnerability can also be further minimised by im-
proving its resilience through the installation of addi-
tional upstream floodgates.  This way the pressure on 
“Kebon Baru” created by accumulating floodwaters 
can be controlled using the additional upstream 
floodgates, thereby reducing the probability of struc-
tural failure due to infrastructure fragility (Turpin et 
al. 2013). This demonstrates the usefulness of the 
adopted approach in highlighting locations where ad-
ditional infrastructure may be required. 
In addition, this approach to vulnerability assess-
ment can be useful to decision makers who require 
justification for vulnerability attribution. For exam-
ple, “Sunter C” ranked as the most vulnerable flood-
gate partly because of its huge exposure to 199.89km 
length of waterways as compared to very low vulner-
ability ranking floodgates like “Duri” and “Sunter 
Utara”, which are only exposed to 3.09km and 
0.92km length of waterways respectively. Another 
reason is because of its high susceptibility to flood 
damage, which can be attributed to the fact that it on-
ly has one gate unit compared to very low vulnerabil-
ity ranking floodgates like “Sunter Utara”, “Honda”, 
and “8” which has 4, 6, and 8 gates respectively.  
Similarly, the very low vulnerability of 56.67% of 
Jakarta’s floodgates is mainly due to their low expo-
sure to flood waters when compared to other flood-
gates in the city. However, in the case of “Karet”, it 
is its high resilience attained through redundancy 
provided by connected upstream floodgates that 
makes it rank as a very low vulnerability floodgate. 
No doubt, such detail of vulnerability attribution can 
leave clues as to what actions can be taken to mini-
mise infrastructure vulnerability. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
This paper has proposed a graph-based network ap-
proach for measuring hydrological infrastructure 
flood vulnerability index (HIFVI), using the concepts 
of exposure, sensitivity and resilience. An application 
of the proposed method produced HIFVI values for 
Jakarta’s floodgates, demonstrating its usefulness in 
ranking and comparing the vulnerability of hydrolog-
ical infrastructure components to flood damage in 
coastal cities.  The results will facilitate transparent 
and efficient targeting of limited resources towards 
routine maintenance, future investments and up-
grades to the flood control infrastructure within 
coastal cities situated in developing nations. Im-
portantly, the method was found to be useful in high-
lighting locations where additional infrastructure may 
be required to improve resilience to flooding. This 
will enable coastal cities in developing nations plan 
for more resilient future and to improve the outcome 
of their structural response to flood hazards. 
One limitation of this study is the absence of addi-
tional data to improve the quality and reliability of 
the technique. This issue can be addressed by taking 
advantage of the graph theory feature, which allows 
for incremental integration of additional data into the 
network model as they become available in the future 
(Bunn et al. 2000). Hence, future study will seek to 
improve the quality and reliability of the technique 
by introducing additional data related to hydrological 
infrastructure components (e.g. asset age, flood 
height capacity, maintenance and failure history). 
Moreover, the impact of flood waters on the hydro-
logical infrastructure can be more accurately ac-
counted for if additional data such as elevation, 
width, depth, roughness, and flow rate of river chan-
nels are available. 
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